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The linkage between trade policies and human rights has led to the growing
economic interdependence among nations that promises to change the nature of trade
relations.' When a nation (like the United States) has considerable economic power, there
is a temptation to use such power to pursue a wide variety of national objectives. However,
sanctions may become even less effective, or indeed obsolete, as a foreign policy tool in
hght of the emergence ofmany new, stronger markets and economies.
Human rights have not figured prominently on the agenda of the nine members
Association for Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) since its inception in 1967. Rather, the
pursuit of regional security and cooperative measures for promoting trade and economic
development has been paramount ASEAN objectives.
By insisting on a strict separation between human rights policy and trade issues,
ASEAN has marginalized human rights and has consistently opposed the use by foreign
states or international organizations of economic or other forms of change to induce change
in human rights practices.
1 Increased economic interdependence has made it easier for countries, which are targeted for sanctions "to find alternate
suppliers, markets, and financial backers to replace goods embargoed or funds withheld by the [sanctioning] country. For
these reasons, we conclude that sanctions are a decreasing policy Instrument." HUFBAUER, SCOTT & ELLIOTT,
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 81 (1985).
2 Matthew W. Cheney, Trading uith the Dragjn:A Critique ofthe use ofSanctians by the United States Against China, 6 J. Int'I L. & Prac.
1, (1997).
^ Li-annThio, hnplerxnting HumanRi^ in ASEAN Countries: Pranises to Ke^ and Miles to^b^im I sleep, 2 YALE. HUM.RTS.
& DEV. L. J. 1(1999).
1
2In an increasingly global economy, international trade is essential for economic
survival and development of nearly all countries, as illustrated by the virtual collapse of
Iraq's economy due to internationally imposed sanctions.'* Therefore, it can be
convincingly argued that trade sanctions are an effective mechanism for the international
enforcement ofhuman rights.^
The question therefore arises as to why countries do not use trade sanctions, or if
they do use them, why then do the sanctions often fail? There are various reasons why trade
sanctions fail. First, the regional human rights conventions currently in force, the United
Nations' favored method of human rights protection, do not provide trade sanctions as an
enforcement mechanism.^
Secondly, the sanctioned-nations often react with refusals to comply with demands
and with indignation at what they perceive to be unmerited intrusions into their domestic
policies,^ a reaction that is entirely understandable in light of the political underpinnings of
the majority of sanctions. And third, the protected rights, which are primarily political in
o
nature, very often have no place in the sanctioned country's domestic policy.
Therefore, for trade sanctions to be effective in the enforcement of human rights, it
is necessary to distinguish between rights that are capable of international enforcement and
those that are not.
Robert S. Greenbiirger, U.S. Faces Tmubk in U.N. as Countries Soften Their Stance on Iraq Oil Emhar^ Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1994,
at A9 (recognizing the influence of trade sanaions in obtaining compliance from Iraq).
5 Patricia Stirling, The Use cf Trade Sanctions as an EnfortBveTt Mechanismfar Basic Human Ri^: A Proposalfajr Addition to the WcM
Trade Or^imzaWn, 1 1 Am. U. J. Int'L & Poly 1 (1996).
^ European Social Charter, 1961, 569 UJ^I.T.S. 89. (guaranteeing fundamental rights to all individuals for the benefit of society
without providing economic sanctions to remedy violations).
7 Andrew Wellington Cordier,5b«£^4^- 7fe%M£r/&icJms, 46 J. Int'L Aff. 193, 193 ( 1992).
8 See, European Social Charter, Supra notes 6 at 569 (asserting that rights which are political in nature would include, among
others, democracy and freedom of speech, and would thus not be compatible with political systems).
3Universally held basic human rights must remain separate from political rights.
Such basic human rights are those that arc so universal that all societies, systems, nations
and ideology could, and do espouse them. Conversely, political rights are those that are
dependent upon compatibility with the system of government in place and arc therefore far
less likely to gamer universal support. An effective multilateral enforcement mechanism
can only succeed if there is universal agreement and acceptance of the protected rights.
Accordingly, at the outset of such a mechanism, only basic human rights may be
enforced through trade sanctions. Once such a system is in place, more political rights may
be included.^ In chapter II of this thesis, I shall discuss a brief history of the International
enforcement of human rights. Providing a brief description of human rights, which are
universal in nature and therefore capable of garnering international adherence and discuss
the current method of protection of human rights, specifically international and regional
conventions.
Chapter III examines the WTO dispute settlement system applied to conflicts
involving trade-human rights conflicts and the basis of including human rights trade
sanctions in the WTO.
Chapter IV examines the unilateral trade sanctions by the United States, whether
Federal, state, or local. These sanctions are used as a weapon of choice to enforce U.S.
foreign policy goals. Some of the sanctions, however, attempt to impose sanctions on
third-party countries that choose to trade with target nations.
' See, Stirling, Stipra note 5, at 3.
4Several nations have retaliated against these sanctions by enacting blocking laws that
prevent their citizens and corporations from complying with the provisions of the U.S.
sanctions, and penalizing them if they do comply.
Chapter V examines the effectiveness of trade sanctions and identifies some instances,
particularly involving small target countries and modest policy goals, where sanctions have
helped alter foreign behavior.
The final chapter, examines the possible ways in which trade sanctions can be used
in an effective way to enforce human rights.
See E.g., Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Aa, RS.C. 1985, c. F-29 (Can.).
CHAPTER 11
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION TODAY
A. Defining Basic Human Rights
The term "human rights", in itself is very problematic because of its abundance of
meaning and definitions. The expression "human rights" shelters an incredibly diverse
range of desire-in-dominance politics and desire-in -insurrection politics." Human rights
have also been defined as a "recognition of inherent dignity and equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family," and that this recognition is "the foundation
of freedom, justice and peace in the world." In essence, the concept of human rights
connotes the security of the individual or group in the face of power, and the justice due
to those people by virtue of their personhood.' International declarations and
conventions currently in force provide a list of human rights, dividing them into civil and
polifical rights, economic and social rights, and collective rights.'^
" Upendra Baxi, Voia£s ofSi^^rmgand Future ofHuman ri^, 8 Transnat'l L. &Contemp. Probs. 125
'2 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 4, GA Res. 217A(ni), UN. Doc. 810 (1948) prohibiting nations
from holding humans in slavery or servitude); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 8(1), Dec. 19,
1966, 999 UJM.Y.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.LM. 368, 371 (precluding the institution of slavery and compulsoiy labor to achieve
the goal of promoting human rights freedoms).
^ RONALD COHEN, ENDLESS TEARDROPSrPROLEGOMENA TO STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AHUCA
IN HUMAN RIGHTS GOVERANCE IN AFRICA 4 (Ronald Cohen ed., 1993).
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 8 (1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 UJ^.T.S. 171,
6Other conventions recognize specific human rights such as racial discrimination,'
apartheid,'^ discrimination against women, '^ and genocide.'^ The regional conventions,
and the universal declaration of human rights address the protection of these rights in
varying forms and, to some extent, expand upon them. Considenng the various
definitions of human rights as well as the myriad of rights contained in the conventions, it
becomes clear that two types of rights are involved: the right to act in a particular manner
and the right to be free from a particular action upon oneself^' Political and economic
rights address the ability to assert one's political opinion and achieve wealth, and
therefore act in a particular manner.
The more basic and passive rights address the right to be free from being acted
upon in some manner either because of some personal immutable characteristics or
simply by virtue of one's personhood.
1^ International Convention on die Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UJ^.T.S. 195, reprinted in, 5 I.LM.
352 (1966).
i'' Intemauonal Convendon on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of " Apartheid," 1973, 13 I.LM. 50.
'* Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 19 IXM. 33 (1980).
" Convention on the Proteaion and Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U-N.T.S. 277.
20 See European Social Charter, Oa. 18, 1961, 529 UJSf.T.S. 89.
2' See Striling, supra note 5, at 8.
7Some examples of the right to act in a particular manner include freedom of
speech,^'' freedom of assembly,^^ freedom of movement,^ the right to work,^^ and the
right to vote. All these rights involve the ability to act affirmatively in a manner that
one chooses without interference from, or denial by, the state. The existence of such
rights for the citizens of a state presupposes the compatibility of such rights with the
existing political system.^^ Accordingly such rights would not exist and would be
unenforceable in a system of government that does not recognize political and economic
rights such as freedom of speech.^' In light of the numerous political and economic
systems in the world that do not espouse all of these rights, there could be no universal
adherence to an enforcement mechanism for them.
The more political of these rights, i.e., those having to do with government and
governance, are intrinsically linked with the particular system of government existing in a
particular state. As there is no universal agreement on a particular political system, there
can be no universal agreement on whether such political rights may be recognized or
even enforced.''^
2'' International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 UJSf.T.S. 3, reprinted in 6 IXM. 368,
371.
« Id. art. 20.
26 Id. art. 12.
27 International Covenant on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, supra note 24, art. 6.
2* International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 15. art. 25.
2' Sterling, supra note 5. at 9.
32 Ai
33 Oscar Schaaer, United Nations Law, 88 Am. j. Int'l L. 1, 1 7 (1994).
8The same can be said of the economic rights since there is no universal agreement
on which economic system is more desirable, and thus there can be no universal
agreement on which economic right should be recognized and enforced.^'*
Contrary to economic and political rights, the more basic, passive rights do not
depend upon the system of government or the economics of a particular state. ^^ These fall
into two categories: the right to be free from action taken upon oneself because of an
immutable characteristic such as race, gender or religion; and the right to be free from
action taken upon oneself simply by virtue of one's personhood.^^ Examples of the
former include the freedom from violent or discriminatory acts based upon one's gender,
race or religion. Examples of the latter include freedom from acts such as torture and
arbitrary detention not by virtue of one's immutable characteristics.^^
There are some rights, other than democracy and other political and economic
rights that are more universally espoused.^^ Indeed, there are rights which are so
universal that all societies, systems, nations and ideologies would or do espouse them.''*^
These rights are the most basic of human rights, those rights that are not political or
economic but rather are passive rights. "^^




39 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, siipra note 12 at 2.
»Id
9There are two types of rights. The first of core human rights arc those rights
derived from immutable characteristics possessed by all human beings.''^ The second type
of core human rights are those derived from immutable characteristic but are possessed
by virtue of personhood.''^ A core human right derived from an immutable characteristic
is the right to be free from an act taken upon oneself as a result of immutable
characteristics.'^'* Accordingly, a core human right would be, for example, the right to be
free from a non-political discriminatory act upon oneself based upon one's gender or
religion.''^ The second type of core human right encompasses the right to be free from
actions that are injurious to the inherent dignity and security of the human being.''^
For this reason, freedom from slavery, genocide, torture and arbitrary arrest are
core human rights. While arguably a government may legitimately deprive its citizens
of political rights such as democracy, freedom of speech and press, it may not
legitimately deprive its citizens of the freedom to be free from slavery, genocide, torture
and arbitrary imprisonment."*^ Therefore, it appears that of the two forms of human rights,
political/economic and core human rights, the latter are more likely to be compatible with
r 49
any system oi government.
^2 Sterling, supra note 5 atl3.
"4 Id. at 14.
•^ Id A denial of the right to vote based upon one's gender, race or religion would not fall into this category as this will be
denial of political right.
t^ COHEN, supra note 14
,
at 10.
•7 Stirling, supra note 5, at 14.
'Ud
10
Since core human rights appear to universally held by all nations regardless of
political belief, however, they could be enforced on a worldwide basis, while the other
political and economic human rights, could not.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations (1987) contains a relatively limited
list of human right to which customary international law applies.^ Specifically, Section
702 provides that it a violation of customary international law if a state, as a matter of
state policy, practices, encourages and condones genocide, slavery, murder, or
disappearance of persons, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, racial discrimination or a
consistent pattern of gross violations of international recognized human rights.
Another document, the protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
and Relating to the protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (the
Second Geneva Protocol) provides for certain minimum rights for all persons affected by
such conflict. ^^ These minimum rights include freedom from torture, collective
punishment, taking of hostages, acts of terrorism, outrage upon a person dignity such as
rape, slavery, pillage, or threats to commit this acts. These rights apply, regardless of
race, color, sex, language, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, wealth,
birth or other status.
^^
5° Restatement (Thirc^ of Foreign Relations Law S 702 (1987).
52 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
international Armed Conflia (Protocol n), adopted June 8, 1977, art. 4, 1125 UJSf.T.S. 609.
5^ Stirling, spqrra note 5, at 15.
5'' See, supra note 52, art. 4(2).
55 Id. ait. 2(1).
11
B. Current Protection Mechanism
Current documents concerning human rights employ varying terms in the area of
human rights. Some documents refer to the "promotion" of human rights,^^' while others
refer to the "protection" of human rights." A majority of documents "recognize" human
rights. No document, however, specifically refers to "enforcement" of human rights.
When one considers the definitions of these terms, the significance of the use of one
tenn or the other becomes apparent and relevant.
By considering the standard dictionary definition of the terms, it can be said that
"promotion" of human rights means the furtherance of the establishment or advancement
of those rights. ^^ "Protect" refers to the guarding against the loss of those rights.^^
"Enforcement," however means to compel the observance of those rights. ^^
The main human rights document is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948.^' In its preamble
the declaration reaffirms the fundamental human rights in the United Nations Charter.^^
The declaration then proclaims that it is to be "a common standard of achievement for all
nations," and that every organ of society" should "promote respect" for these rights, thus
implying that these rights already exist.^'^
5^ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12 (declaring that the documents represents the commitment of all
peoples and nations to promote respea for rights and freedoms).
57 African Human Rights Charter, June 26, 1981, 21 I.LM. 59 (hereinafter Africa Human Rights Charter) (reguiring the
contracting parties to recognize all individuals' equality and rights to liberty and due process).
58 THE RADOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1548 (2d ed. 1987).
59 Id at 1553.
«'/d:at644.
^1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, sicpra note 12.
12
The rights contained within the declaration encompass political rights/*^ economic
rights^^ and core human rights such as freedom from racial discrimination,^^ arbitrary
arrest,^^ torture,^^ and slavery.^^
Being a declaration, the document has no enforcement mechanism and places no
organ to be responsible for the enforcement. The Declaration has over time, however,
acquired authority as customary international law in the preservation of human rights/'
From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came two covenants: The
77
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,^^ both entered into force in 19767'^ Both
covenants conform with, as well as expand upon, the Universal Declaration.
^'* Id art. 21 ("Everyone has a right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives").
^5 Id. art. 17, 22-25 ("Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security....").
«>«• Id art. 2.
67 Id art. 9.
68 Id art. 5.
69 Id art. 4.
70 THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL, 119
(1990) (noting that the UN. General Assembly adopted the declaration in the form of a non-binding resolution")
7' AH. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS WORLD (1989). "(The Declaration was not intended to
impose legal obligations on states").
72 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 24.
73 International Covenant on Qvil and Political Rights, supra note 15.
7'' Id pmhL; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 31.
75 See supra note 74.
13
In the area of protection of human rights, the hiternational Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contains a provision whereby parties agree to
submit report to the Secretary General on measures they have taken to achieve
conformity with the rights contained in the covenant. The reports are then transmitted to
the Economic and Social Council, which in turn may transmit the report to the
Commission on Human Rights for study and recommendation/^
In addition, art 23 provides that "international action for the achievement of the
rights recognized... includes such methods as the conclusion of conventions, the adoption
of recommendations, the furnishing of technical assistance and the holding of regional
7R
meetings...." Such methods, while possibly effective for promotion of human rights
cannot be seen as effective enforcement.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for a Human
Rights committee to which states parties submit progress reports on measures they have
taken to achieve the rights contained within the covenant. ^ Unlike the International
Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, however, article 41 of this covenant
provides for the submission of communication by one state party to the committee
concerning claims that another state party is not fulfilling its obligations under the
Qr\
covenant. Under article 41, the committee may then bring the matter to the attention of
the state party so accused.^'
7* International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, si^a note 31, art. 16(1).
77 li art. 16(2).
78 Id. art. 23.
79 International Covenant on Qvil and Political Rights, supra note 15, art. 40.
80 /a[ art. 41(1).
«i/c/.art.41(l)(a).
14
The state party must then communicate with the accusing state within three
months as to domestic procedures and remedies taken. If there is no settlement, either
may present the matter to the Committee, Which will then examine the situation and
issue a report.
Additionally, if the matter is not settled, article 42 provides that the committee
may appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission, which may also examine the situation
and issue a report. These provisions illustrate more extensive mechanism for protection
than those in the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, yet
none that could be characterized as effective enforcement. Further, while an optional
protocol, entered into force in 1976, permits petition from individuals and non-
governmental organizations,^^ few states has chosen to adopt it.^'' Worse still those states
that have not adopted the protocol include those with the worst records on human
rights.^^
In addition to the general lack of acceptance of the Optional Protocol, there have
go
been questions as to the efficacy of the reporting requirement in these documents. As
stated above, both covenants require states parties to submit reports to the Secretary
General as to the progress they have made in implementing the provisions of the
covenant.
82/^ ait. 4 1(1) (a).
83 Id. art 41(l)(b)-(h).
84 Id. art. 42(l)(a).
85 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, U.N. G.A Res. 2200 p<XI),
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 383 (entered into force in 1976).
86 BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 373 (1991)
(noting that only 48 countries are parties to the optional protocol).
87 ROBERTSON, supra note 71, at 65.
88/ci
15
National officials who are unlikely to call the attention of an international body to
their failure in the area of human rights compile these reports. Moreover the report
cannot act on enforcement mechanism unless independent persons, who are not
governmental officials, follow-up with examination of the information, and unless an
international body takes enforcement action. '^° Yet, regardless of these shortcomings, it
cannot be denied that the very existence of these covenants is an important step towards
the international protection of human rights. '
Beyond these covenants, there are a number of international documents
addressing specific violations of human rights, all with varying provisions of
enforcement. Some, such as International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Racial Discrimination, contain the same type of enforcement mechanism as noted
above i.e., report by state parties to a committee. ^^ Other documents contain more
specific method of enforcement that have a punitive tone.^"*
In addition to these international document based upon the United Nations charter
and Declaration of Human Rights, there are also regional conventions for the protection
ofhuman rights. ^^
89 /i at 41.
90 /i at 4142.
'1 Stirling, supra note 5 at 19.
92/d:
«7i
'' 5a? Genocide Convention, supra note 19, art. IV (mandating that, "persons committing genocide....shall be punished,
whether they are constitutionally responsible rtilers, public officials, or private individuals").
95 Stirling, supra note 5 at 20.
16
Originally, the concept of enforcement was not favored by the United Nations due
to the perception that "it might detract from the perceived universality of human rights".^^
As regional regimes developed, however, resistance by the United Nations decreased.^^
Finally, in 1977, by way of Resolution 32/127, the General Assembly asked states not
belonging to regional regimes such as the general homogeneity of regions and a
OR
geographic proximity that leads to greater interdependence and cooperation. In addition,
the regional, as opposed to the universal aspects of the regimes provides a better chance
of investigation and remedying of violations.^^ Currently, three regional regimes are in
force: The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms,'^^ The American Convention on Human Rights, '°' African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights. '^^
All the above three conventions address much the same political, civil and
economic rights as the United Nations' convention. Both the European and the American
Conventions provide for human rights commissions (the European Convention and the
American Convention provide for human rights commissions (the European Commission
and American Convention provide for human rights and Inter- American Court ofHuman
rights).^°^
'^ Bums H. Weston et al., RegondHumanR^Re^mes: A Ccrnpariscn andAppraised, 20 Vand J. Transnat'l L. 585, 588 (1987).
97/d:at 591.
99 Id. at 589-90.
100 European Human Rights Convention, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 UJSf.T.S. 221.
•0' American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.LM. 673.
102 African Human Rights Charter, June 26, 1981, 21 1.LM. 59.
105 Stirling, supra note 5 at 21.
17
Both conventions provide standing for states, groups and individual before cither
the commission or the court. '^'^ The African convention provides for commission, but not
court.'^^ All three provide for submission of petitions to their commission from those
petitions to their commissions from those who feel their rights under the conventions
have been violated.'
It is generally regarded that the European convention has functioned well.
Between 1953, its first year of legal effect, and 1990, 15,000 applications alleging
violations were accepted for review by the commission. The majority of these
applications were accepted for review by the commission. This petition led to 244
cases before the European court of Human Rights with 129 judgements against states. '°^
All judgement in which the states lost were accepted to the member states, thus
illustrating a willingness on the part of Western European states to accept judgement by
an international court.
"°
The Inter-American Convention allows individuals or groups to petition the inter-
American commission concerning violations of rights under the convention.' '^ The
Commission then conducts investigations, including on-site investigations.
°5 African Human Rights Charter, supra note 102 art. 30.
°^ American Human Rights Convention, supra note 101, art. 44; European Human rights Convention, supra note 100, art. 25;
African Human Rights Charter, supra note 102 art. 47.
07 DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NEW EUROPE 182 (1994) (noting that the Council of Europe
"produced the most authoritative and effective system for the promotion and protection of human rights ....").
09 H
lo/d: at 182-83.
'' American Human rights Convention, supra note 101, art. 44.
12 Id art 48.
18
However, while the commission conducts more on-site investigations than any
other similar body in the world, it is able to pursue only a small number of petitions it
receives."^ After the investigation the commission attempt to achieve a friendly
settlement between parties. The commission also functions as a " gatekeeper" to the
Inter- American Human Rights Court by selecting cases to be taken before the court."''
While private parties may not litigate cases before the court, their attorneys may act as
legal advisors to the Commission."^
One major difference between the Inter- American system and the European
system is the fact that all member states of the Council of Europe have ratified the
European Convention, While only two- thirds of the members of the Organization of
American States have ratified the Inter-American Convention."^
The African Charter for Human and Peoples rights encompasses many of the
same right as the other regional convention, but with some important differences. The
aim of the African Charter is to eliminate apartheid, discrimination, and remnants of
..IIS
colonialism. The rights contained in the charter are the rights of" peoples" and based
upon the group norm rather than the rights of an individual, thus reflecting the
communitarian aspects of African society."
"^ David J. Padilla, The Inter-Amerkan Cavrmssiat on HummRi^ of the Oi^mzatkn cfAmerican States: A Case Study, 9 AM. U.J.
Int'lL&Pol'y 95, 101(1993).
11^ Id. at 108.
ii^/i at 109-10.
'17 Thomas M. Franck, The erier^rigRi^ to Donxratk GoiemarKE, 86 Am. J. Int'L 46, 86-87 (1992).
118 Julia Swanson, The Emer^meofNewRi^ in tfx African Charter, 12 N.YX. Sch. J. Int'L & Comp. L. 309. (1991).
19
Another difference between the African Charier and other regional conventions is
lack of a human rights court. '^^ As the authors of charter explained, disputes are settled in
a more traditional manner of friendly arbitration rather than in the adversarial manner of
the west.
'^'
While the Arab states and Asia have not created regional human rights regimes,
1 77
they have taken some steps towards protection of human rights. In 1 968, the Council of
the Arab League adopted a resolution relating to the creation of a Pcnnanent Arab
Commission on Human Rights. Subsequently, the Council of the Arab league drafted a
Declaration of Human Rights. The draft contained what one commentator referred to
as three-fold objective: "(A) concern for continuity with the past, a desire to achieve an
Arab unity,... and a call for justice in respect of the Arab population living in the
I 7 S
occupied territories."
As for Asia, there has been some non-governmental movements such as the
Permanent Standing Committee on Human Rights created in 1979 by Lawasia, a
professional association of Asian and Western Pacific Lawyers.
•20 Id.
12' Id at 330.
122 ROBERTSON, si^a note 71 at 196-200.
123 /dl
124 B. BOUTROS-GHALI, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, IN THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 575, 579 (Karel Vasak eA,1982).
125 /i
126 HIROKO YAMANE, ASIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS, IN THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 651, 664 (Karel Vasak ed., 1982).
20
However, the vast dilTercnces in culliire, politieal ideology, and eeonomie
development among Asian nations, coupled with lack of a regional organization have
made a cohesive policy on human rights impossible.
C. International Enforcement of Humnii Ri{;lits
While there is a plethora of international treaties and agreements created to protect
human rights, commentators continually question whether it is even possible to enforce
elTectively such rights on an international level. ' One commentator noted that while
there are numerous United Nations' votes, international instruments for protection, and
state declarations, "for a large part of humanity including a large part of what we
generally call the 'Western' world, observance of human rights is presently a dream of
things to come" as opposed to a reality.
Infringements on a state's sovereignty are one of the primary reasons for the
apparent failure to establish an effective international regime for the enforcement of
human rights. Few states wish to become parties to treaties that interfere with their
domestic policies, particularly those policies regarding domestic treatment of their
citizens.'"^" Moreover, article 2(7) of United Nations Charter prohibits the United Nations
from intervening in matters that arc "essentially within domestic jurisdiction of any
state."'^'
•27/d[at651.
'^' Seymour J. Rubin, Ecamrtac cuui Sociil Ihonoi Ri^Xs iirul tlx' New hiUmiturud Eairuriik Onkr, 1 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 67, 70-
71 (1986) (declaring that the slate of hiun.uiiiy wiili regards to iium.m rights rem.iin bleak).
1" Id. at 71.
'^° Striling, supra note 5 at 5.
'^iU.N.Ciiarter,art.2,
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One may then question whether a state's treatment of its citizens is truly a matter
for international law, and therefore not subject to international enforcement in the event
that the state violates human rights. Yet, history shows that effective international
enforcement can happen. One of the first attempts at the enforcement of a human right
took place in the early nineteenth century with the international effort to abolish
slavery. '^^ In 1814, the Treaty of Paris between France and Great Britain established
cooperation between two nations in order to suppress the traffic in slaves. Later in the
spring of 1890, the major European powers held an anti-slave trade conference in
Brussels.''''^ The Belgian delegate later described the conference by stating that "never
before had all the Great Powers come together so singled-mindedly set on so generous,
pure and disinterested a purpose to save the 'oppressed and decimated' races of Africa
and end the monstrous trade in human flesh." '"'^
At the end of the conference in July 1890, delegates created and later ratified an
anti-slavery act, providing measures for the suppression of slavery both in Africa and the
high seas.'^^ In addition, the act contained one of the earliest examples of implementation
in the guise of a special office attached to the Belgian Foreign Ministry created to
oversee the enforcement of the act. Later, the twentieth century saw the right to be free
from enforced servitude enshrined in many international human rights documents.
"2 ROBERTSON, supra note 71, at 15.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA 397 (1991).
136 Id at 399.
137 ROBERTSON, st^a note 71, at 15.
138 See, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12. art. 4, (prohibiting nations from holding humans in slavery or
servitude); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 15. art. 8(1), (precluding the institution of
slavery and compulsory labor to achieve the goal of promoting human rights and freedom).
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Consequently, over a 1 50-year period, the prohibition against slavery
became an established rule of customary international law that, while not always
followed, nations universally accept as internationally enforceable. Despite this
example, the question persist whether human rights can, and should be enforced
internationally, or whether they are truly a domestic concern of each state. In the late
1960s, one emanate commentator, H. Lauterpacht, argued that any matter is essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the state only if international law does not regulate it
and cannot regulate it.'""^ Lauterpacht contended that there are few such matters, if any,
and that if there are international repercussions, international law governs.'"^' The
profusion of international documents entered in to force in the latter half of the twentieth
century addressing the protection of human rights proved Lauterpacht correct by
illustrating that nations no longer regard human rights as a domestic matter.''' Indeed,
Lauterpacht maintained that once international obligations governs action, it no longer
fall under domestic jurisdiction.''*^ For example, while a nation's duty to protect citizens
from slavery was once a purely domestic matter,''*"* It is now universally accepted duty
governed by international obligation.''*^
139 Id. at 15.
i«H LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 175 (1968).
i^'/i
'"^ See, International Covenant on Economic, Social and CvJtural Rights, supra note 31 (setting international standards and
norms for the treatment of humans to promote the right to self determination).
i« LAUTERPACHR, supra note 58, at 176.
''•'' See ROBERTSON, supra note 71, at 15 (discussing the 150-year transition issue of slavery from being purely domestic to
being solely under the authority of international law).
i« Id at 15.
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The main reason for the international acceptance of freedom from slavery as an
internationally enforceable human right is the fact that it transcends politics and
economics.'''^ The freedom from enforced servitude is a right that is basic to the citizens
of any society, state or political system.'"*^ As such, it is one that may be, and has been,
agreed to and enforced on an international level under the auspices of the United Nations
without any assertion by any members of interference in their domestic political
systems.''**^ While some commentators argue that the primary purpose of the United
Nations is the enforcement of international peace and security, there are those who assert
that the United Nations has a second and equally important purpose as evidenced in the
Chater's preamble, namely the international protection of human rights.''''^ Beyond the
preamble, other commentators point to Articles 13, 55, 68 and 76, which all address
human rights in various forms, thus establishing the United Nations' competence and
duty to protect human rights.'^ In addition, most commentators now agree that article
2(7) allows the United Nations to act to protect human rights, particularly because
egregious violations of human rights represent a threat to international peace. '^'
'•^ Strling, supra note 5
,
at 6.
i« MICHEAL REISMAN & MYER S. McDOUGAI, HUMANITTARIAN INTERVENTION TO PROTECT THE
IBOS, IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND UNITED NATIONS, 167, 178 (R Lillich ed, 1973); F.
TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 131 (1988).
150 B.C. RAMACHARAN, THE CONCEPT AND PRESENT STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 267(1989).
'5' Oscar Schaaer, United Nations Law, 88 Am. J. Int'l L 1, 17 (1984); Krislen Walker, An Exploration ofArtide 2(7) ofthe United
Nations Charter as an EmbodimoTt ofthe PMic/Prkate Distinction in International Law, 26 N.Y.C. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 173, 180-81
(1994).
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However, while the United Nations' may clearly recognize human rights, it does
not effectively enforce them. This lack of effective enforcement is due in large part to the
expansiveness of the United Nations' definition of what constitute human rights. As the
enforcement of the prohibition of slavery suggest, however, if the enforced human rights
are truly universal in nature and apolitical, then effective international enforcement is
possible.
CHAPTER III
TRADE- BASED DECISIONS ON TRADE/HUMAN RIGHTS CONFLICT
The theoretical risk posed to human rights law from the differing approaches to
moral decision-making adopted by trade law and human rights law is borne out at the
doctrinal level when one examines the approach the WTO dispute settlement system
would actually take to conflicts involving trade and non-trade values, including trade-
human rights conflict.
A. Human Rights Trade Sanctions in the WTO
As the GATT treaty stands today, there is no single clearly applicable exception for
Human rights violations. However there has been domestic trade-restrictive measures
adopted at the national level against an egregious rights-violating state, Examples of such
measures might include a national-level decision to suspend GATT-obligated MFN
treatment as a response to particular human rights violation, '^^ the imposition by a sub-
federal unit of a government procurement ban in response to human rights violations, or the
imposition of a trade ban on the products of indentured child labor, either unilaterally or
perhaps in response to a future ILO convention prohibiting such practices.'^'*
The common denominator here is state action imposing trade sanctions on human
rights violations as a mechanism to both punish the state and to encourage compliance with
international human rights law.





However, the target state would challenge such actions in a WTO dispute
settlement proceeding. The most likely basis for such challenge would be that the measure
violates the most-favored-nation and national treatment rules contained in GATT Articles I
and III.'^^ The challenge measure would be determined a prima facie Article I violation,
because the like product from other WTO Member State which are not target are subject to
trade restriction.'^^ The measure is also likely to be determined a prima facie Article III
violations, because like domestic products are also not subject to the same trade
restriction.'^^ Therefore, the sanctioning state is going to find a GATT- authorized
exception applicable in such cases, or face a judgment that the measure nullifies or impairs
the target state's expected trade benefits, and the likelihood of being itself subject to WTO-
authorized sanctions if it fails to amend or withdraw the measure.
There are, however, several exceptions, which might apply if interpreted with
human rights in mind. One possible avenue is that the sanctioning state could seek the
National security exception in Article XXI.
'^^
Article XXI permits state to unilaterally
enact trade-restrictive measures when the state judges such measures to be "necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests" during time of "emergency in international
relations."'^^
155 Ai
'56 Philips M. Nichols, GA TTDoctrine, 36 Va. J. Int'l L 379, 437 & nn. 333-35.
157 Id at 436 nn. 327.
158 H
'^' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A- 1 1, T.I.A.S. NO. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; Genaral
Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade- Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Final Act Embodying the
Result of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (GATT 1947 was
incorporated into the WTO as GATT 1994 in Annex lA to the WTO Agreement) (hereinafter GATT) art. XXI(b)(iii).
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However, this is a controversial provision much disHkcd and distrusted by the
majority of WTO Member States, in that its not justifiable as it has been interpreted. "'^
Therefore, states would be reluctant to invoke this provision absent at least a plausible
national security risk, and the WTO would likely to oppose any effort to read that exception
broadly enough to include general human rights-based trade sanctions.
Another possible exception is Article XX, whose exceptions are intended to permit
GATT violations, including Article 1 and III violations, in pursuit of several categories of
non-trade policy goals. '^^ Three Article XX exceptions in particular, the public morals,
human life and health, and prison labor exceptions, may be relevant in connection with
human right measures.'^"' Article XX(a)permits measures "necessary to protect human
morals."'^'^ Article XX(b) permits measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health.""'^ Finally, Article XX(e) permits measures "relating to the products of
prison labor."'^^
The availability of these exceptions turns on two sorts of interpretive problems.
First, each presents at the outset a similar textual issue, namely whether the scope of
the exception can be interpreted to accommodate human rights-based measures.
"'° Raj K. Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade Law. 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 6-20 (1997) (critically
assessing Article XXI ).
'^' Garcia, supra note 153 at 12.
'^^ As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the availability of the Article XX exceptions is limited by the chapeau
test prohibiting that measures otherwise justifiable under that article be applied so as to be "a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination. . .or a disguised restriction on international trade." GATT, supra note 160, art. XX.
'^' Garcia, supra note 153 at 12.
iM GATT, supra note 163, art XX(a).
165 GATT, supra note 163, art. XX(b).
166 GATT, supra note 163, art. XX(e).
167 Garcia, supra note 153 at 13.
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The prison labor exception is least likely to serve in this case, despite the fact that
arguably it is the clearest case of human rights exception in GATT, for the very reason
that it is so clearly drafted to refer to a single category of products, namely those
produced by prison labor.
'^^ The public morality exception should apply in at least a
subset of human rights-related claims, but its broader applicability turns on whether the
provision can be interpreted to encompass a wide range of human rights concerns beyond
traditional "public morals" issues.
'^^
Finally, interpreting Article XX(b) to include human rights violations as threat to
"human ... life or health," would run counter to existing, albeit limited, GATT
jurisprudence on this issue.' ''° Second, availability of both public morals and human
rights exception depends upon whether Articles XX(a) and XX(b) would be interpreted
as available for "outward-oriented" measures designed to influence human rights policies
of another jurisdiction,*^' which existing GATT jurisprudence calls into question. '^^
If none of these exceptions are available on scope or territoriality grounds, then the
hypothetical human rights measure proposed above would be ruled a GATT Violation.
'68 GATT, supra note 163, art. XX(e); but see Striling, supra note 5, at 33-39 (arguing it would be a "logical extention" of Article
XX(e) to apply it to a broad range of human rights violations).
169 Steve Chamovitz, Vx Moral Exceotian in Trade Policy, 38 Va. J. Int'I L. 729-30 (1998).
170 Garcia, supra note 153 at 11.
172 /dL
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If, however, these scope of issues could be resolved so as lo bring human
rights-based domestic measures within the ambit of cither Article XX (a) or (b), then
adjudication of GATT claim would ultimately rest on the application of the "necessity"
test required by the language of the article.
'^^ As the testis applied, the WTO panel would
rule that the disputed measure was not infact necessary, and therefore a GATT violation,
if it were to find that another less trade-restrictive measure was "reasonably available."'^'*
In conditioning the availability of these Article XX exceptions, and therefore any
human rights favorable resolution of this conflict, on the necessity test, the WTO is
applying what has been called a trade of device, a term encompassing various legal
techniques used in trade institutions to relate the trade burden of a given measure against
its intended non trade regulatory benefit.'''^ It is in the utilization of trade-off devices, and
in choice of application of a particular device, that the WTO dispute resolution system
embodies the utilitarian approach to normative conflict in trade, and in so doing raises
issues about its compatibility with human rights law.'^^
173 Id at 64 -65.
174 /d:
175 Id.
176 Joel Trachtman, in his pioneering study of trade-off devices, identifies as potential trade-off devices national treatment rules,
simple means-end rationality tests, necessity/least trade restriaive alternative tests, proportionality, balancing, and cost-
benefit analysis. Joel P. Trachtman, Trackand ...Prvl^eris, Cost-Ben^A riaJysis and subsidiarityy 9 Eur. J. Int'L 32, 32 (1998).
.
177 Garcia, at si^a note 153.
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B. Trade-off Mechanism in The Trade/Human Rights Linkage
The very notion of trade-off devices runs counter to the deontological approach to
human rights. '^'^ In human rights terms, one cannot morally trade a certain amount of
human rights violation in exchange for a greater amount of trade welfare benefit, even if
the later is seen as enhancing or embodying other human rights. While it is foreseeable
that a trade-based forum may be legally required to engage in some sort of balancing
analysis, weighing the human cost of protection against the human rights cost of
acquiescence, such analysis might be objected by human right advocates at the outset as
simply inadequate in view of the absolute moral obligation to enforce human rights
regardless of consequences. On this view, the preeminent mechanism for resolving
policy disputes in trade institutions by its very nature defeats the fundamental tenet of
human rights law.^^'
In thus failing to distinguish a subset of values the trade off which is not
permitted, some may view any trade analysis as already skewed in favor of trade values
over human rights values. However, it may nevertheless be inevitable that a trade-off
type of analysis will be carried out in the event of regulatory conflicts, at least under the
current international governance regime.
178 M
180 Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Takir^ Ethics Seriously: Economics ctrd Contmiparary Moral Pljilosophy, 3 1 J. Econ.
Literature 671 (1993). at 696.
"1 Garcia, supra note 153 at 13.
182 IcL
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Some form of balancing is often involved in policy formation: one compares two
options in terms of their mutual effects on identified values, and one decides.'*^''
In particular where the dispute is not directly between trade law and human rights
law, but trade law and domestic measures enacted to enforce human rights, it is
conceivable that the balancing be used in determining the appropriate or most effective
means towards achieving the human rights goals when there is a trade cost. Any such
approach, however, and in particular the trade-off device actually employed, must be
carefully examined and carefully utilized in policy decisions where rights are involved, or
the very nature and principle of rights has been violated at the outset. Therefore, it
becomes important to evaluate each trade-off device in terms of degree in which it
discriminates against human rights. Trachtman concludes that from a trade perspective
certain measures are to be preferred over others, citing in particular the necessity test.'^^
C. The WTO Necessity Test as a Trade-Off Device
Notwithstanding the argument that some sort of balancing is required in policy-
formulation where competing values are at stake, the necessity test is clearly
objectionable in human-rights terms as a trade-off device on the ground that it is biased
in favor of trade values. '^^
187 /dL
188 Trachtman, si^a note 177, at 81-82.
189 Philip M. Nichok, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L Rev. 658, 699-700, (1996).
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In other words, the test evaluates measures favorably precisely insofar as their
impact on trade is least possible, despite the fact that more trade-impacting measures
might be more effective in realizing the non-trade value. Not only does this trade-off
mechanism fail to recognize the high priority which rights must hold in any policy
determination, but in fact the necessity test turns this on its head, and privileges trade
values over all other competing values.
To a limited extent the "reasonably available" qualification invites some
consideration of the effectiveness of the disputed measure in accomplishing its non-
trade regulatory purpose, since any less trade-restrictive measure, which forms the basis
for an invalidation of the chosen measure, must be "reasonably available" in view of the
state's non-trade regulatory objectives. The extent of such consideration, however,
depends entirely on the interpretation of such language, and the application of the
qualification, by GATT panel. In particular, the language clearly does not require
specific consideration of the effectiveness of alternative measures in achieving their
non-trade goals.
^^'*
''° Garcia, at supra note 153.
'"See Thomas J. Schoenbaiim has argued that the current GATT/WTO interpretation of the Article XX(b) necessity test
turns the provision "on its head" in a literal sense, in that "necessa/' refers syntaxtically to the need for protection of life
and health, and not to the trade effeas of the measure, and is thus wrong on texual grounds. Thomas J. Schoenbaum,
International Trade andPnMlkntfthe Enimjmmt: the ContinubigSeard}forRea^ 91 Am. J. Int'L. 268, 276 (1997).
"2 See Garcia at supra note 153.
micL
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Therefore, it would be consistent with the language of the necessity test as
currently interpreted for GATT panel to find that a measure significantly less effective
in achieving the non-trade purpose would nonetheless be identified by the panel as
"reasonably available," and therefore serves as the basis for invalidating the chosen
195
measure.
This is disturbing in that, since such measure was infact not chosen by the
sanctioning state, this language has the effect of substituting the trade forums opinion of
rationality of alternatives for the opinion of the legislative forum. '^^ If one considers that
domestic legislatures may, in principle and at least in certain cases, produce legislative
outcomes "on the merit," then it is clear that the language of Article XX (a) and (b)
invites the questionable substitution by a panel of trade experts, with a built-in bias
favoring trade values, of less effective human rights measure in the place of a more
effective, democratically-selected, human rights measure on the basis of the measure's
effect on trade.
1^^ Trachtman, si^a note 177 at 69.
i'7 Garcia, at supra note 153.
CHAPTER IV
UNITED STATES ENFORC EMENT OF THE LIINKA(;E BE IWEEN TRADE
POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH SANCTIONS
The United States uses unilateral action as the predominant method by which it
involves itself in the international human right sphere, particularly in its encouragement
of democracy. '^^ It often acts unilaterally in response to what it considers to violations of
human rights. ''^'^ Its actions take the form of sanctions and, most recently in the case of
Haiti, armed force. ^^ While often inclined to employ unilateral actions when it feels
another nation is violating human rights, the United States has been reluctant to become a
party to International Conventions for the protection of human rights.
The apparent reluctance of the United States to assume international obligations is
a major stumbling bock to a concerted international effort at enforcing human rights, the
largest and the most powerful democracy in the world is largely absent from the
multilateral protection of human rights. ^
"8 Micheal Okscnberg, Heading Cffa New Cold Warwoh China: Hillary, Harry and the New Polidcs ofAsia, Wash. Post, Sept. 3,
1995, at CI.
1'' Striling, supra note 5, at 33.
201 James F. Smith, NA FTA and Human Ri^its: A Ncossary Linkage, 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. Rev. 793, 806 (1994) (explaining that
the United States has consented to three of tlie seven major United Nations hiunan rights Instruments).
202 Striling, supra note 5.
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The litany of treaties and convention to which the United States is yet to become
a party includes the American Convention of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,^' the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women,^^^ The United States ratified the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, but not until
twenty-eight years after initial transmission to the senate. In 1988 the United States
ratified the Convention Against Torture, but only after adding numerous reservations
regarding among other things, the death penalty and the definition of torture. The
70S
reservations includes almost all possible defenses to a torture prosecution. In addition,
the United States recently ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, albeit with five reservations, five understanding and four declarations. ^°^ The
910
United States not to adopt the optional protocol allowing individual petitions.
Rather than becoming an international participant in the multilateral enforcement
of human rights through ratification of the convendons, the United States has in recent
years, preferred the use of unilateral action such as sanctions.^"
203 American Human Rights Convention, 9 I.LM (1969).
^°^ See supra note 24..
2°5 See supra note 18.
206 Genocide Convention, si^a note 19.
207 James F. Smith, NAFTA and Human Ri^: A Necessary Linkage, 27 U.C Davis L. Rev. 793, 806 (1994) (explaining that the
United States has consented to three of the seven major United Nations human rights instruments) at 829-30.
208 Ai
209 David P. Stewart, Text ofU.S. Resenation, UnderstardingandDedaratians, 14 Hum. Rts. L. J. 77, 123 ( 1993).
210 /i
211 Oksenberg, si^a note 199 at CI.
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A. Federal Trade Sanctions
7. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment
The Trade Act of 1974 provides that no non-market country is eligible to receive
most favored-nation (MFN) treatment if the President determines that it denies its citizens
the right opportunity to emirate. Under title IV, section 402, m order for a country, not
receiving MFN treatment and to benefit from certain other U.S. credit and guarantee
programs, it must comply with the freedom of emigration requirements of section 402
7 1 ^
and enter into a trade agreement with the U.S. under section 405 Of the Act. Section
402 requires that a country not deny its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate and
not impose more than a nominal tax on emigration, or on visas or other document
required for emigration. ' Section 402 permits the waiver of these strict requirements in
the event that the President determines that a waiver will substantially promote the
objectives of section 402 and receives assurances that the emigration practices of the
country concerned will henceforth lead substantially to the achievement of section 402.^^^
There are specific procedures set out for congress to take action to override the
7 1 A
President's action and deny MFN treatment.
212 Trade ha of 1974, s 402, 19 U.S.G s 2432 (1988).




2. The Helms-Burton Act
i. Background
Helms-Burton^'^ is intended, in part, to apply increased political pressure and
economic pressure on Castro government in order to facilitate the establishment of a
9 1 8
democratically elected government in Cuba. Helms-Burton attempts to reach this goal
through a reaffirmation and strengthening of existing trade sanctions against Cuba and a
creation of action against persons who "traffic" in real property owned by U.S. nationals
but expropriated without compensation by the Castro government on or after January 1,
1959.^'^ The stated purposes of the four provisions of Helms-Burton are:
1. To seek international sanctions against the present Castro government;
2. To assist Cuba toward a transition to a "democratically elected;"
3. To protect the "property rights of U.S nationals" who had their property in Cuba
expropriated by the Castro government as a result of the 1959 Cuban Revolution
by providing them with a private cause of action; and
4. To exclude from the United States aliens who have or "traffic in" property
confiscated from U.S. nationals in Cuba.^^°
217 The Helms-Burton Act was named after its primary sponsors, Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN).
Helms-Burton Provisions, Boston Globe, July 17, 1996, at AlO. Harvey Oyer, The Extratenilarid Effects ofU.S. Unilateral Track
Sanctions And Thar Impcta Oi OU^ations UnderNA FTA, 1 1 Fla. J. Int'IL 429 (1997)
218 Helms-Burton § 3, 22 U.S.CA. § 6022.
219 Helms-Burton, 22 U.S.CA § 6032 (a).
220 Seeld § § 6031-6046, 6061-6067, 6081-6085, 6091.
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Title III of the Helms-Burton creates a private right of action against persons who
"traffic"^^' in real property that was once held by U.S. nationals^^^ hut later expropriated
without compensation by the Cuban government on or after January 1, 1959. Under Title
III, persons or companies who traffic in confiscated property would be held liable for
money damages^^^ to any U.S. national who owns a claim to the confiscated property.^^"*
The most onerous provision permits claimant to seek damages in an amount equivalent to
the full value of the property and not limited to the value of the property from which the
defendant has actually benefited or used.
Additionally, Title III explicitly rejects the acts of state doctrine and empowers
U.S. courts to adjudicate property claims arising from a foreign government's
expropriation that occurred on foreign soil. These provisions are an attempt to exercise
U.S. law extraterritorially. Title IV of Helms-Burton provides broad immigration
exclusion from the United States of any alien who have confiscated property of U.S.
nationals or who traffic such property."
221 See Id § 6023 (13). Defines "traffic" as follows:
(A).... Person "traffic" in confiscated property if that person knowingly and intentionally— (i) sells, transfers, distributes,
dispenses, broken, manages, or otherwise dispose of confiscated property, or purchases, leases,receives, possesses, obtains
controls of
,
manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property, (ii) engages in commercial
activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property, or (m) causes, direa, participates in, or profit from,
trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (li) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in clause (i) or
(ii) through another person, without the authorization of any United States national who holds claim to the property.
222 Id § 6063(c)(1)
223 Id § 6082(a)(3)(B)(C).
224 Id § 6023(15).
225 Id § 6082(a).
226 /^.§ 6082(a)(6).
227 Id. § 6091(a) (discussing the "Grounds For Exclusion").
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The provision is broad in the sense that it defines excludable aliens as including
not only those individuals directly responsible for confiscation of property but also
anyone who directed or oversaw a confiscation or gained from a conversion of
confiscated property, including corporate officers and controlling shareholders of
companies that have been "involved" in the confiscation or trafficking of property as well
as their spouse and minor children. The authority to determine who will be denied a
visa for travel to the United States under Title IV rests with the Secretary of State.
//". International Law Implications
One principle of customary international law prohibit a court in state A from
sitting in judgment of public acts of government of state B if the effects of the public acts
of state B occur solely in state B. This principle of international law is based on
sovereignty and comity. In the United States, the prmciple is known as the act of state
9*^9
doctrine. It applies when tangible property is situated in the taking state at the time of
expropriation. Helms-Burton appears to violate this principle.
228 Harvey Oyer, The Extratenitarial Effects ofU.S. Unlaterd Trade SarictkrisArd Thar bnpaa On U.S. Obligation Under NAFTA, 11
Fla.J.Int'IL429,437(1997).
229 Id.
230 ANDREA F. LO^VENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATIONAND ARBITRATION 458 (1993).
231 L^N BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289-90 (4'>> ed. 1990).
232 H
233 LOWENFELD, supra note 23 1, at 523.
234 Oyer, supra note 229 at 438
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Helms-Burton also may violate the international legal principle of "continuity of
claim."^''^ Under this principle a U.S. Claimant must have been a U.S. citizen or national
from the time the claim arose, continuously until the time the claim is adjudicated.^^^
Helms-Burton, however authorizes claimants who were Cuban citizens at the time of
their claims arose to bring claims if they are U.S. citizens at the time of their claim of
damages under Title III is made. By permitting current U.S. citizens who were Cuban
citizens who were at the time of the expropriation to bring claims, Helms-Burton is
violating significantly broadens the class of permissible claimants beyond the bounds of
what is allowable under current international law.
Helms-Burton also raises the issue of violation of national "sovereignty".
Sovereignty is a long-recognized principle of customary international law.^^^ The
principle of sovereignty holds that a state has full power to enact laws that govern its own
internal affairs within its own territorial jurisdiction, but cannot enact laws that govern
the internal affairs of other recognized sovereign states.'^'*'^ Helms-Burton violates Cuban
sovereignty because it allows a U.S court to sit judgment of the acts of the Cuban
government in confiscating the property of its own citizens.^"*' Moreover, and more
troubling to most countries, is that by imposing sanctions on foreign countries such as
Canada and Mexico who choose to trade with Cuba.^"*^
"5 Kem Alexander &Jon Mills, ResolzJ^PmpertyCLvms in a Post- Socialist Cuba, 17 Law & PoFy Int'I Bus. 137, 156-57 (1995).
"6 l± at 158.
^37 Id,
238 Oyer, supra note 229 at 439.
™ BROWNLIE, supra note 232, at 287-88.
^'•1 Oyer, supra note 229 at 439.
2« Id.
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The effect of Helms-Burton is to chill third-country business activity with Cuba.
While the economic isolation of Cuba is part of the congressional intent underlying
Helms-Burton, the penalizing of third-country parties for continuing to trade with Cuba is
tantamount to secondary boycott. This is problematic from an international law
perspective because of secondary boycotts, encroach on the sovereignty of other
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nations.
Helms-Burton's greatest encroachment on existing international law may exist in
the arena of jurisdiction to prescribe.^'^'* The concept of jurisdiction to prescribe defines
the extent to which a nation may extend its laws extraterritorially.^'*^ Title III of Helms-
Burton provides a cause of action in the U.S. court against any foreign individual or
company that has made the requisite definition of trafficking in expropriated Cuban
property."'*^ The provision allows a U.S. court to seize or attach the property of any
foreign defendant located in the United States and to gain personal jurisdiction over that
defendant in order to satisfy a civil judgment under Helms-Burton based on an act or
decision that occurred entirely outside the United States.^'*^
2t3i/at440.
2« LOWENFELD, supra note 2'i\, at 46.
^'^ Helms-Burton, 22 U.S.CA § § 6082-6083 (Liability for Trafficking in Confiscated Property Qaimed by United States
Nationals,' and Proof of Ownership of Claim to Confiscated Property, respectively).
^'•7 See Id. %% 6082(c)-(e). Apparendy, even property temporarily located in the United States satifies the requirement. For
example, a foreign ship in transit that calls into a U.S. port is subjea to seiizure and attachment.
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///. International Reaction to Helms-Burton
On July 16, 1996, President Clinton suspended the authorization for filling of
private action under Title III for six months, presumably to avoid an immediate rash of
fillings and consequent reaction from other nations. Every six months after the initial
suspension President Clinton renewed the suspension of Title III for another six-month
period, thus continually delaying the most contentious of the Act's provision.^'*^
The international reaction to Helms-Burton has been an overwhelming
denouncement of it as violative of established international law. The Canadian
Parliament responded by amending existing blocking laws to make it illegal for Canadian
business, including Canadian subsidiaries of U.S parent companies to comply with
Helms-Burton, It further amended their Foreign Extraterritorial Act (FEMA) to provide
Canadian companies with a means of counter suing in Canadian courts to recover
damages awarded by U.S. courts under Title III of Helms-Burton. The Canadian
legislation also prevents enforcement in Canada of U.S. judgment that results from the
Helms-Burton litigation in the United States.^^^
In early September 1996, Mexico's Senate unanimously approved a
Helms-Burton "antidote" law, fining Mexican companies that allow themselves to be
sanctioned by Helms-Burton.^^^
2AS Oyer, supra note 229 at 442.
2'" President Qinton's Second suspension of the right to bring a private cause of action under Tide HI occurred on Jantiary 3,
1997. Steven Lee Meyers, OneKeyElement in And-Cuha Law PostponedAgain, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1997, at Al.
«o The Helms-Burton Law: Biter Binen, THE ECONOMIST, June 8, at 45 ( U.S. ed).
^51 FEMA, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-29.
252 Id. § 9.
253 Id § 8.
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Also in early September 1996, the eleven-member Juridical committee of the
Organization of American States (OAS) wrote a unanimous statement condemning
Helms-Burton as contrary to international law.^^"*
The European Union (EU) has followed the lead of Canada and Mexico and
enacted legislation (EU Regulation) that prohibits nationals or business entities of the EU
from complying with the provisions of Helms-Burton. The EU Regulation has both a
"Blocking" provision and a "Claw-back" provision. The blocking provision prevents
the courts of EU member nations from either recognizing or enforcing judgments that
give effects to the provision of Helms-Burton. The claw-back provision authorizes EU
nationals and companies that have suffered damages as a result of U.S. sanctions to
counter-sue the responsible U.S. party in a civil action in any EU member nation.^^^
The congressional intent was to redress the wrongs committed by the Castro
regime against foreign property owners and hasten the demise of his regime, However in
trying to do so the violated the principles of sovereignty, continuity of claim, and
jurisdiction to prescribe under customary international law.
251 Oyer, supra note 229 at 444. The Mexican Senate passed the "antidote" law by vote of 118-0. Under the Mexican Senate
version of the "antidote" law, Mexican companies would be fined equivalent of 100,000 days of the minimum wage for
submitting to any sanctions from foreign countries.
255 Council Regulation 227 1/96, Protecting Against the EffeX ofdx Extra-Tenitarid ApplioOwn ofLegislation Adopted by a Vyird Country,
1996 O.J. (L309) 39.
256 Id. art. 4 & 5, at 2 (Non- Recognition of Foreign Judgements and Non- compliance with Foreign Orders, respectively).
257 Id. art. 6, at 2-3 (Recovery of Damages).
258 /a:
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B. State Trade Sanctions
Most of the state and local sanctions are in the form of:
1. Selective purchasing restrictions, where the state or local government is
prohibited from purchasing goods or services produced by the target country;
2. Investment restriction where the state or local government is restricted from
investing in the target country;
3. Divestiture, where the state or local government must divest itself of any current
investment in the target country; or
4. Secondary restrictions, where the state or local government is prohibited from




Massachusetts enacted a selective purchasing statute in June 1996 that targets
Burma (Myanmar). The statute bars the government of Massachusetts from purchasing
from companies that do business with Burma. This amounts to secondary boycott
because Massachusetts is penalizing not only Burmese companies, but also any company
in the world that carries on business with Burma and also wants to conduct business with
Massachusetts.
^^^
259 Oyer, SKpra note 229 at 451.
262 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 7, § § 22G-22J (1997).
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2. State ofFlorida
Another example of state secondary boycott law is the 1996 enactment of the
Cuban Freedom Act by the Florida Legislalure.^^^ The CFA imposes criminal sanctions
on violators of its provisions. ^ The CFA imposes a secondary boycott by virtue of
section 288.853(6)(a), Which makes it a third degree felony for "any person, firm, or
corporation to import into Florida any sugars, syrups, or molasses that are the product of
a country that imports sugar, syrup, or molasses from Cuba." " The intent of this
section is to prevent indirect subsidization of the Cuban sugar industry through countries
that buy sugar for domestic consumption then sell their on sugar to the United States at
inflated prices under sugar quota allotment program." While the intent of this provision
is a laudable one, the effect is the imposition of secondary boycotts on anyone importing
sugar or sugar products into Florida via a threat of criminal sanctions. Section
288.853(3) of the CFA makes it a third degree felony for a financial institution located or
doing business in Florida to finance transactions involving confiscated property in
Cuba.^^«
2" Cuban Freedom Aa (CFA), Fla. Stat. § § 288.851-.885 (1997) 1996 Ha. Laws ch. 96-188.
2" If any citizen or legal resident of Florida, state agency, or financial institution located or doing business in Florida extend a
loan, credit, or other financing to a person for the purp)ose of financing transaction involving confiscated property in Cuba,
that person, agency, or institution commits a felony of the third degree. Id. § 288.853(3). Moreover, any person firm, or
corporation that's imports into Florida any syrups, or molasses that are the produa of a country that has imported sugar,
syrup, or molasses from Cuba commits a felony of the third degree. Id. § 288.853(6)(a).
^^Id
2^7 This provision prpovides protection to the Florida sugar industry while the CFA fails to apply such restrictions on an)' other
commodity or produa of Florida. Id
268 Id. § 288.853 (3).
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C. County and City Secondary Boycott Laws
Like state governments, county and city governments have enacted laws and
ordinances that have the effect of imposing secondary boycotts. The City of Berkeley,
California, for instance, has enacted laws that prohibit the city from purchasing from
firms that transact business with Burma, Nigeria, or Tibet.^^'^ Like the other states and
local sanctions, Berkeley's sanction laws are enacted on moral grounds as a response to
human rights violations in the target countries.
The unilateral sanctions taken by the United States to enforce human rights appear
to have engendered a great wariness towards United States on the part of smaller nations,
particularly those of South and Central America. Rather than joining its neighbors in
the collective enforcement of human rights by way of conventions and the like, the
United States appears instead to its neighbors to be inflicting its beliefs upon them.
Consequently, its South American neighbors appear to look upon the United States as an
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"imperialist democracy.". In addition to a wariness, there is resentment on the part of
those neighbors as a result of the united States refusal to join in the regional regimes to
protect human rights. This resentment is perhaps due to the manner in which the
United States appear to be quick to judge what it deems to be its neighbors' violation of
human rights, while seemingly not allowing any judgement of its own possible
violations.^'"*
^^'Organization for Intemationallnvestment (OFH), State covl Mtmkipal SanctionsReporuMsY \\, 1998.
270 /d[
271 See James F. Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary Lmka^ 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 793, 806 (1994).
272 Mat 816.
273 See Id. at 812 (citing the resistance by the United States to the OA.S. human rights regime).
27'' 5a? /(i at 8 12 (comparing and contrasting the faa that the United States applies pressure on Latin America countries to ratify
the American Convention, yet President Carter signed the American Convention contigent upon numerous reservations).
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Unilateral actions by the United States also have another adverse effect: that of
garnering support not for the United States, but rather for the object of those actions, as
was recently seen in the case of Burma. The United States policy towards Burma's
brutal regime was to isolate the country by cutting off all trade. No Asian nation would
cooperate with the United States, however, forcing it to reopen talks with Burma's
leaders.^^^ During trade talks in Indonesia in November 1994, Chinese President Jiang
Zemin stated that many Asian nations, including China, reject the United States view that
individual liberty and political freedom are fundamental human rights that take
precedence over an entire nation's stability and communal rights of its citizens. Burma
is an example of a less successful attempts of the United States to act independently as a
world arbiter of human rights. ^^^
^''5 Ross Howard, Canada Puts Trade Before Ri^, Toronto Globe & Mail, May 12, 1995, at Al. Canada's government, in
agreement with ASEAN, annoced its intent to sever the link between human rights andtrade, particularly in regard to Burma
and China. Id Canada's Foreign Relations Minister, Andre Ouellet, stated that the best way to promote democratic
development is through developing trade, regardless of whether other goverments are in agreement with Canada's beliefs
about human Rights. Id
^7<' Id zt 31.
277 Thomas Lippman, Asian Nations CfienD^ U.S. Wishes, Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1994, at A14.
278 Id
279 See sz<pra note 5 at31.
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The participation of the United States, arguably the most powerful and influential
country in the world, would greatly add to the strength of the international and regional
human rights conventions.
CHAPTER V
EFFECTIVENESS OF TRADE SANCTIONS
For trade sanctions to be used effectively to enforce human rights it is important
that the sanctions are targeted to the extent where they will be effective in making a real
change in the target country's behavior by making it change its policies in a major way,
while not inflicting unduly concentrated cost on the targeting country or countries.
The sanctions that were enforced against Yugoslavia and South Africa are examples of
situations where sanctions have been used effectively to change the human rights
situations of these countries:
A. Trade Sanctions against Yugoslavia
The former Yugoslavia is an example where sanctions were used effectively to
enforce human rights violations. In June 1991, open hostilities broke out in former
Socialist Federal Republic Of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Following the declaration of
independence by Slovenia and Croatia, two of the six republics of SFRY, the government
of Belgrade deployed Yugoslav National Army (JNA) against the two republics.
Responding to the situation, the security Council established a comprehensive arms
embargo against the SFRY on September 25, 1991 (Res. 713(1991).^^'
280 Sokol Braha, The Changng Nature Of U.S. SanctionsAgmist Yugoslavia, 8 MSU-DCLJ. Int'L 273, (1999).
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However when it was clear that the government of the Federal Rcpuhlic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) was not complying with the repeated demands of the Security Council
to withdraw units of the JNA from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and tom cease
interference there, the Security Council adopted Res. 757 (1992).
On May 30, 1992, establishing a comprehensive sanctions against Yugoslavia.
The regime included economic sanctions, a ban on flights, and diplomatic sanctions. '^^^
Specifically, the resolution prohibited the import of commodities and products
784
originating in the FRY and export of goods to Yugoslavia. It also prohibited the
transfer of funds to the authorities of FRY for commercial, industrial or public utility
undertakings. Paragraph 7 of the resolution established a ban on all flights departing
from or arriving in Yugoslavia or flying over the territory of the UN member states. ^^^
Through this resolution, the members decided to reduce the number of diplomatic
representatives from Yugoslavia and even prohibited individuals or groups representing
7K7
Yugoslavia from playing in sporting events in their territories. In addition, scientific
and technical cooperation and cultural exchanges with persons or groups sponsored by
the Yugoslav authorities was suspended.^^^ The resolution did allow trans-shipment
through Yugoslavia of products originating outside SFRY, but only for the purpose of
transshipment.
282 U.N. SCOR, 46'h Sess., UJSf. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992).
283 See, supra note 282.
28^ See paragraph (4) of resolution 757 (1992).
285 Id. [rule 4.1] at para 5. 5.




Finally, the resolution contains provisions for humanitarian exceptions allowing
the shipment of medical supplies and flight upon prior approval from the Security
Council Sanctions Committee, which oversee the implementation of sanctions.^**'^
By Resolution 787 (1992) of November 16, 1992, the Council prohibited the
Trans-shipment through SFRY of certain products including crude oil, petroleum
products, coal, iron, steel, vehicles, and aircraft. The Council also decided that any vessel
in which the majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or
operating in FRY shall be considered FRY property for purposes of implementing
security Council resolutions. ^^° These prohibition of transshipment were done in order to
prevent good from being diverted for use in FRY. In order to enforce these prohibitions,
the Council authorized states to take measures to halt and verify any vessel destined for
FRY ports.^^'
Resolution 820 (1993) further strengthened the sanctions regime and expanded its
application to areas under Serb control in Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia. Under this
resolution, vessels which were suspected of having violated Security Council resolutions,
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would be stopped from entering Yugoslavia's Ports. By enacting this resolution, the
Security Council decided to freeze all funds belonging to FRY or persons in FRY and to
prevent citizens from making funds available to FRY. Similar to resolution 757, certain






Finally, the resolution prohibited all services to Yugoslavia both financial and
non-financial, leaving exceptions for telecommunications, postal services, legal services
in accordance with 757 (1992), and those approved by the SC Sanctions Committee.
Following a decision by the Yugoslav authorities to close the international border
with Bosnia-Herzegovina, covering the areas controlled by the Bosnia Serbs, the Security
Council decided for the first time to ease sanctions against Yugoslavia by suspending for
one hundred days the ban on civilian flights. Civilian ferry transportation and
participation in sporting events. On the same day, the Council authorized a
strengthened regime of sanctions against Bosnia Serb Party. By resolution
1022(1995),^^^the Security Council decided to suspend sanctions against Yugoslavia
indefinitely. On the same day, the Council decided to phased termination of arms
embargo against former Yugoslavia, established in pursuant to resolution 713 (1991).^^^
Application of the measures against Bosnia Serbs party continued however, it was not
until October 1, 1996 that sanctions were terminated with respect to Yugoslavia and
Bosnia Serbs.
The UN sanctions against Yugoslavia, was the most comprehensive set of
sanctions ever implemented. The chronology of the resolution indicates that the Council
used its power to impose economic sanctions with great degree of flexibility.
293 S.C. Res. 820. UN. SCOK
29" S.C. Res. 943. UN. SCOK
295 S.C. Res. 942. UN. SCOK
296 UN Doc. S/RES/1022 (1995).
297 S.C Res.1021. UN. SCOK
298 Braha, si^a note 282. at 6.
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The U.S. and European Union used certain forms of coercion, which produced
some limited effects. However, up until the adoption of resolution 757, such coercion was
partial and fragmented and therefore ineffective in its goal to change the behavior of the
Bosnia Serbs. ^^^
There was also unnecessary delay in establishing the sanctions, which further
crippled the effectiveness of the Security Council action. The Security Council wasted
one year in calling for an end to the arms embargo, which ironically was established upon
request of the Belgrade Government, harmed only the victim of aggression, because the
limited flow of arms made establishing an effective defense very difficult.^°°
The sanctions against FRY were both punitive and coercive. They were punitive
because of the Yugoslav Government's major responsibility for the continuation of the
conflict, and coercive in seekmg to restrain its behavior in supporting the Bosnia Serbs.
In large part, however, "they were also a response to gross human rights violations,
particularly to 'ethnic cleansing.'"
The Sanction that were placed against Yugoslavia forced them to change their
policy of open support for the Bosnia Serbs and thus forcing them to negotiate peace that




302 MAGARET P. DOXWY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONSIN CONTEMPORARYPERSPECTIVE 9 (1996).
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B. Trade Sanctions Against South Africa
On June 18, 1986, the House passed an economic sanctions bill, which would
have virtually ended all trade with South Africa and would have required all U.S.
businesses to leave that country within a six-month period.^^ The Senate rejected the
stringent sanctions bill passed by the House, and began work on its own sanctions bill in
July 1986.^°''
The Senate version was ultimately adopted by both houses of Congress but was
vetoed by President Reagan on September 26, 1986. Both houses voted to override the
veto and the Act became law on October 2, 1986.^^^ The declared purpose of the Act, as
stated in subsection (a) of Section 104 thereof, is "to set forth a comprehensive and
complete framework to guide the efforts of the United States in helping to bring an end to
apartheid in South Africa and lead to the establishment of a non-racial, democratic form
of government." To accomplish this end, the Act specifies that, "the United States will
work towards this goal by encouraging the Government of South Africa to:
• repeal the present state of emergency and respect the principle of equal justice under
law for citizens of all races;
• release Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Walter Sisulu, black trade union leaders, and
all political prisoners;





307 Casey, supra note 304 at 181.
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• permit the free exercise by South Africans of all races of the right to form political
parties, express political opinions, otherwise participate in the political process;
• establish a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws;
• negotiate with representatives of all racial groups in South Africa the future political
system in South Africa; and
• end military and paramilitary activities aimed at neighboring states."
The act further provides that, to encourage these six specific actions on the part of
the South African government, the United States will use the economic, political, and
diplomatic measures as set forth in this Act; and the United States will adjust its actions
towards the government of South Africa to reflect the progress or lack of progress made
by the government of South Africa in meeting the broad goal of establishing a non-racial
democratic form of govemment.^*^^
The Act codifies the sanctions adopted by the President in his South African
Executive Order if September 9, 1985. See Exec. Order No. 12532, supra. It contains ten
of the eleven measures specified in the Marlborough House Communique issued in
Londonby the Commonwealth Heads of Government on August, 1986(all except a
provision on visa services).^'^
31° Casey, si^a note 304 at 182.
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1. The scope ofthe Act
The Act is intended, as it's title suggest, to be comprehensive statement of U.S.
anti- apartheid poHcy.^" The Act defines "South Africa" to include (1) the Republic of
South Africa, (2) any territory such as Namibia under the administration, legal or illegal,
South Africa, and (3) the "Bantustans" or "homeland" to which South African blacks are
assigned on the basis of ethnic origin, including the nominally independent Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, and Venda. The Acts imposes various restraints on trade with
"south Africa," a term which includes corporations, partnerships, and other business
associations or entities residing or organized outside South Africa.
It also regulates the behavior of "nationals of the United States," a term which
includes U.S. citizens and any corporations or business associations organized under the
laws of the United States, including affiliates and subsidiaries of foreign companies under
U.S. law.^'"*
2. The Ban on New Investments and loans
The centerpiece of the bill was section 310, which states that "no national of the
United States may directly or through another person, make any new investment in South
Africa" '^ "New investment" is broadly defined to include either a loan or a
"commitment or contribution of fiinds or other assets."
313 M
3'^ Casey, supra note 304 at 182.
315 /J
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A loan includes overdraft, currency swaos, the purchase of debts or equity
securities issued by the government of South Africa or a private South African entity, the
purchase or guarantee of a loan made by another person, the sale of financial assets
subject to an agreement to repurchase, or a renewal or refinancing whereby funds or
credit are transferred or extended to the government of South Africa or a South African
entity.""^ "A commitment or contribution of funds or assets" is not defined in the Act.
The Act specifically exempts, however, the following from its definition of "new
investment":
• the reinvestment of profits earned by a U.S. controlled South African entity in itself
or another South African entity;
• contributions of money or other assets which are necessary to enable U.S. controlled
South African entities to operate in an economically sound manner without expanding
its operations or comply with the mandatory Code of Conduct based on the sullivan
princiles in section 208 of the Act;
• Ownership of interest or share in South Africa entity or a security of South African
government before the date of enactment of the Act (October 2, 1986), or a transfer or
acquisition of such interest or security that does not result in payment, contribution of
funds or assets, or credit to South African entity or the South African Government.




317 Casey, supra note 304 at 184.
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Section 204 orders the U.S. Export-Import Bank to take steps to encourage the
use of its facihties for extension of credit to business enterprise in South Africa "that are
majority owned by blacks or other non-white South Africans."
3. Measures Affecting Exports to South Africa
Section 304 prohibits exports of computers, computer software and related
goods, services and technology to the South African military, police, prison, weapons,
research, and other "apartheid enforcing" agencies and organizations. According to the
Export Administration Regulation issued by the Department of Commerce, other
"apartheid-enforcing agencies" include the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Home
Affairs and National Education, the Ministry of Constitutional Development and
Planning, the Ministry of Law and Order. Also included are, Ministry of Manpower, the
Ministry of Education and Developing Aid, including the Development Board and Rural
Development Boards. Likewise, the local, regional, and "Homeland Agencies" that
-510
regulate employment, classification or residence of non-whites are included too.
• Section 307 prohibits most export of equipment, materials, technology useful for
nuclear explosive purposes.
• Sections 317 and 318 prohibit the export of any item on the U.S. munitions Control
list 9 part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR") of the
Department of State) to South Africa.
• Section 32 1 prohibits the exports of crude oil or refined petroleum products subject to
U.S. jurisdiction to South Africa.^ '^
^•' Casey, si^a note 304 at 187.
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4. Measures Affecting Importation of Goods and Servicesfrom South Africa
Section 301 codified the prior Executive Branch poHcy prohibiting importation of
Krugerrands and other gold coins minted in South Africa. Section 510 contains an
identically worded prohibition on importation of gold coins minted in South Africa.
Section 302 prohibits the importation of arms, ammunition, military vehicles, or
manufacturing data relating to such items, from South Africa.
Section 303 prohibits the importation of any article grown, produced,
manufactured, marketed, or exported by South Africa Parastatal organization. "Parastatal
organization" means an organization owned, controlled or subsidized by the South
African government. This prohibition does not, however, include corporations or
partnership that receive start-up assistance from South Africa Industrial Development
Corporation but are now privately owned. "
Section 309 prohibits imports of uranium ore, uranium oxide, coal, and textiles
manufactured or produced in South Africa. Section 319 and 320 prohibits the import of
agricultural products and their derivatives, and any "article that is suitable for human
consumption" produced in South Africa, iron, and steel.
Finally, section 402 authorizes the President to limit the importation into the U.S.
of any product or services of a foreign country to the extent that such country benefit




5. Miscellaneous Provisions Affecting U.S. Business
The Act requires all U.S. nationals employing at least 25 persons in South Africa
to adhere to a Code of Conduct based on the Suliivan Principles. It calls for the
following:
• desegregating the races in each employment facility;
• providing equal employment opportunities to people of all races;
• assuring that the pay system is applied without regard to race;
• establishing minimum wage which take into account the needs of employees and "the
appropriate minimum economic level";
• increasing the number of non-white south Africans in managerial and supervisory
positions;
• taking steps to improve employees' lives with respect to housing, transportation,
schooling, recreation, and health; and
• recognizing the rights of employees to join labor organizations.
Section 313 of the Act mandated the termination of bilateral tax treaty in force
between the U.S. and South Africa since 1946 and related protocol."'^''
^2' The Sullivan Principles were proposed by the Reverend Leon Sullivan, a black West Viipnian Baptist minister, while serving
as a member of the Board of Direaors of General Motors Corporation
^^* See Casey, si^a note 304 at 189.
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Section 306 of the Act also required immediate termination of landing rights for
South African aircraft and prohibiting U.S. civil aircraft from flying to South Africa.




Human rights and trade were for a long time exclusive from each other as they
were considered not to be connected and mutually exclusive. Trade would continue
between countries even when there were serious human rights violations taking place
within a specific country. Human rights was considered a domestic matter and criticism
of violations was considered interference with their internal affairs of their sovereign
state, therefore foreign states could not intervene on the violations. This all change when
the interdependence between countries lead to the adoption of universally held moral
standards which has been documented in the United Nations charter which specifically
recognized human rights.
After the adoption of the United Nations charter and Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, human rights have therefore figured prominently whenever trade issues
are discussed. This arises due to instances of some trading countries being considered to
be violating the human rights conventions by their acts. This has created a moral dilemma
when trading with these countries, while their citizens of are often sensitive to human
rights and are normally ready to boycott good from the violating countries. This has
therefore lead to the conflict between human rights and trade, since some countries are
reluctant to use trade as a means of enforcing human rights violations. The reason being
that sometimes the violating country has an important trade item that is very essential to




The effect of it's own enforcement will have a devastating impact on it's
economy, example of this was seen with Jordan reluctant to enforce sanctions against
Iraq cause it was dependent on the cheap oil from Iraq.
As already discussed in this thesis trade has been used effectively to enforce
human rights and alter the behavior of the violating country forcing it to conform with the
held human rights standards. As was the case in the white rule of South Africa that was
forced to change its policy of apartheid and former Yugoslavia that also had to stop its
human rights violations. There are also instances where trade sanctions has failed to alter
the behavior but actually made the violating country more adamant in enforcing its
policies despite the sanctions. Burma is an example where attempt by the United States to
enforce trade sanctions failed because of lack of support from the ASEAN countries
forcing the United States to change the approach. Cuba is another example where
successive U S administration has failed in their attempts to weaken Fiddle Castro's hold
on power. Both this failures' are due to the US unilateral enforcement of sanctions and
lack of a coordinated universal approach.
Therefore, trade sanctions should continue to be used as a means of enforcing
human rights. However, the enforcement should be on a universal basis rather than a
unilateral basis, and also the decision to impose trade sanctions must also have a
universal approach through the United Nations and not unilaterally by an individual state.
This unilateral approach is a great source of resentment especially from smaller state's
which are normally easily targeted and consider it as imposition of neo-imperialism
policy on them especially by the United States.
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Effective enforcement of human rights is necessary to aUcr the behavior of
violating countries. I hope that violations of human rights by countries will soon be a








1. Frank J. Garcia, The Global Market and Human Rights : Trading Away the
Human Rights Principle. 25 Brook. J.Int'l L. 51 (1999)
2. Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for
Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition of the World Trade Organization,
1 1 Am. U.J. Int'L.& Pol'y 1 (1996).
3. Matthew W. Cheney, Trading with the Dragon: A Critique of the Use of
Sanctions by the United States against China. 6 J. Int'l L. & Prac. 1 (1997)
4. Upendra Baxi, Voices of Suffering and Future ofHuman Rights, 8 TransnatT L &
Contemp. Probs. 125 (1997)
5. Li-ann Thio, Implementing Human Rights in Asean Countries: 'Promises to Keep
and Miles to go Before I sleep' 2 Yale Human Rts. & Dev. L. J. 1 (1999)
6. Catherine Casey, Use Of Economic Sanctions To Promote Human Rights: The
Case of Economic Sanctions Against South Africa. C399 ALI-ABA 165 (1989)
7. Sokol Braha, The Changing Nature of U.S. Sanctions Against Yugoslavia, 8
MSU-DCL J.Int'l L. 273 (1999)
8. Andrew Wellington Cordier, South Africa: The Impact of Sanctions, 46 J. IntT L
Aff. 193(1992).
9. Oscar Schacter, United Nations Law, 88 Am. J. IntT L. 1 (1994).
65
66
10. David J. Padilla, The Inlcr-Amcrican Commission on Human Rights of the
Organization Of American States: A case Study, 9 Am. U.J. Int'I L. & Pol'y 95
(1993).
11. Thomas M. Franck, The emerging Rights to Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J.
Int'L. 46(1992).
12. Julia Sw^anson, The Emergence of New^ Rights in the Africa Charter, 12 N.Y.L.
Sch. J. Int'L & Comp. L. 309 (1991).
13. Hiroko Yamane, Asia and Human Rights, In the International Dimension Of
Human Rights 651, Karel Vasak ed.,(1982).
14. Seymour J. Rubin, Economic and Social Human Rights and the New International
Economic Order, 1 Am. U. J. IntT L & Pol'y 67 (1986).
15. Raj K. Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade Laws, 31 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 1,(1997).
16. Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and Problems, Cost- Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity,
9Eur. J. Int'L. 32(1998).
17. Daniel M. Hausman & Micheal S. McPhearson, Taking Ethics Seriously:
Economic and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. 31 J.Econ. Literature 671
(1993).
18. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Enviroment:
The Continuing Search For Reconciliation, 91 Am. J. Int'L. 268 (1997).
19. James F. Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary Linkage, 27 U.C.
Davis L. 793(1994)
67
20. David P. Stewart, Text of U.S. Reservation, Understanding and Declaration, 14
Hum. Rts. L.J. 77(1993).
21. Catherine Casey, Use Of Economic Sanctions To Promote Human Rights: The
Case Of Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, C399 ALI-ABA 165 (1989).
Books
1. Hufbauer, Scott & Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (1985).
2. The Random House Dictionary of English Language (2d ed. 1987).
3. Thomas Buergenthal & Harold G. Maier, Puplic International Law in a Nutshell
(1990).
4. A.H. Robertson & J.G. Merrils, Human Rights In the World ( 1 989)
5. David P. Forsythe, Human Rights In the New Europe. ( 1 994).
6. B. Boutros- Ghali, The League of Arab States, In the International Dimension of
Human rights, ( Karel Vasak ed., 1982).
7. Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble For Africa ( 1 99 1 ).
8. Barry E. Carter & Philip R. Trimble, International Law Selected Documents
(1991).
9. H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1968).
10. Micheal Reisman & Myers s. McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the
Ibos, In humanitarian Intervention and United Nations (R. Lillich ed., 1973).
11. B.G. Ramacharan, The Concept and Present Status of the International Protection
OfHuman Rights (1989).
12. John H. Jackson, Davey & Sykes Jr. International Economic Relations (3rd.
1994).
68
13. Andreas F. Lowcnfeld, International Litigation and Arbitration.(1993).
14. Ian Brownlic, Principles of Puplic International Law (4"' ed. 1990).
15. Magrct P. Doxey, International Sanctions In Contemporary Perspective 9(1996).
